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Standards play an important role within information and communication technology as it
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“I have always been in the standards business.” - Bill Gates 1991
“[Standardization] is not a linear, straightforward or cumulative process. Iterative cycles and
wasted efforts are very usual. I think "chaotic" is a more appropriate word [for the description of
the development process] than "predictable" or "planned". This naturally makes the ability to
operate in such an environment and ability to understand the process even more important.”
Participant of 3G standardization 2000

Introduction
Standards have continued to play an increasingly important role within information and
communication technology (ICT) as it has become networked, ubiquitous and complex. Multiple
theories that have been suggested within the areas of economics, sociology, and management can
be used to analyze portions of ICT standardization processes. Their limitation is that they pay
scant attention to either the technological innovation and exploration inherent in ICT activity or
to the institutional aspects of standard enforcement and exploitation (March, Sproull, and Tamuz
1991) necessary for successful adoption. Consequently, they often fail to analyze all of the
necessary events and settings that influence ICT standard emergence as a dynamic process.
In this article we propose a process model of standardization that helps analyze ICT
standard emergence as a dynamic process. We conceive standardization to be a process of
creating a technical standard and (possibly) diffusing it into the market place. A standard is
understood as a set of technical specifications adhered to by a set of producers, either tacitly or as
a result of a formal agreement (David and Greenstein 1990, p.4). The process of standard
creation integrates the following three intertwined activities: 1) creation of artifacts that can meet
a set of requirements embedded in the standard and formulated by the involved actors; 2) a
possible deviation from the current technological trajectory in the form of innovation that opens
a new (cognitive) design space; and 3) a mobilization of a set of actors that are willing to follow
and embrace such deviations and solutions. A faithful account of standardization processes must
rely upon a multi-theoretical framework that integrates these three activities. We suggest that
such a framework can be developed by drawing on Simon’s theory of design (Simon 1981), the
Weickian concept of sense-making (Weick 1995) and the Actor-Network theory’s (ANT) idea of
mobilization and negotiation within socio-technical networks (Latour 1995; Callon and Law
1989). These three theoretical lenses help integrate models of design and negotiated agreements
that align actors’ interests, along with the “reading” of new meanings into designs, into the
analysis of standardization processes.
We use the proposed framework to examine standardization processes in the dynamic
field of telecommunications (Schmidt and Werle 1998; West 2000, Bekkers 2001, Bekkers and
Smits 1998, Hanseth, Monteiro and Halting 1996) by exploring three standardization cases. We
demonstrate how an analysis of ICT standardization processes can benefit from simultaneously
capturing the activities of design, sense-making, and negotiation. Our analysis shows that
standardization processes unfold necessarily as a dynamic interplay of these three recursively
organized activities. Future standardization studies should therefore be open to theorizing over
complex processes by drawing upon multiple theoretical bodies.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review several
streams of literature on standardization and analyze their strengths and weaknesses. In Section 3,
we outline the theoretical ingredients of the process model of standardization and discuss the
critical activities of design, sense-making, and negotiation. We also show how they unfold
dynamically and recursively. Next, in section 4 we investigate three standardization episodes
using the multi-theoretical lenses of the standardization model and show how each type of
activity is required in order to achieve closure in the standardization process and how these
activities are dynamically triggered. Section 5 includes a discussion of the theoretical
implications of the proposed process model and how it can be used in future research. Finally,
Section 6 comprises a summary of the paper.

Standardization Research Issues
ICT Standardization Defined
ICT standardization can be defined as the process by which two or more actors come to
agree upon and adhere to a set of technical specifications of an ICT system, its parts or its
functionality, either tacitly or as a result of a formal contract (David and Greenstein 1990).
Hence, ICT standards concurrently enable and constrain the behavior of various actors in the
future (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2000). To achieve such an agreement, actors must do the
following: signal their willingness to develop a standard; participate in formulating the principal
concept and scope of the standard that makes sense for them; agree on the exact content and
form of the standard; develop a contractual agreement for “gives” and “takes” in relation to
standardization process and its outcomes; and agree upon what conforming to the standard
specification actually means. The form and content of these activities may vary. Further, not all
of them are necessarily carried out during the standardization process (Schmidt and Werle 1998).
During any of these steps, some or all actors may fail for a variety of reasons. The
process spans several contexts that range from laboratories and R&D departments to marketing
negotiations that deal with intellectual property rights, brand names and so forth. Thus
standardization, through its promise to coordinate multiple activities that help move new ICT
technologies successfully to markets, can erect vast arenas of coordination that need to connect a
myriad of actors, artifacts and locations over time and space (Jørgensen and Sørensen 1999).
The actors’ motivation for engaging in ICT standardization is high. Those who are
successful in setting ICT standards seize significant competitive advantages and reap monopoly
rents, while firms that are locked out of the standardization process or remain laggards face
significant difficulties (Schilling 1998). Recently, traditional institutional forms of ICT
standardizing have become rife with problems and cannot cope with the increased scope, pace
and complexity of the standardization processes (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2000; Schmidt
and Werle 1998; Werle 2000). ICT standard setting has become a risky proposition as many such
processes fail and do not meet actors’ expectations. The typical questions raised in the new
situation may include the following: How do successful standards emerge in the ICT? How are
competitive advantages accrued from adhering to them? How are they chosen and maintained so
that they can enlist a sufficient number of followers and become successful? What processes and
institutional forms does one need to put in place to create successful ICT standards? What
institutional or contingent events and factors influence the creation of ICT standards? These
research questions have posed considerable challenges to researchers in several areas for
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consequent theory building about standardization including innovation and organization theory,
management, economics, and the sociology of technology.
The complexity and dynamism of ICT standardization set specific challenges for theory
building. Concepts must be open-ended, but at the same time sufficiently exact to capture the
essential features of the standardization processes and their outcomes. They should help us
become sensitized to the specifics of standardization and analyze processes that are emergent,
chaotic, and involve multiple elements (technical, managerial, economic, social etc.). Critical
issues that these concepts should help highlight include those listed here: 1) standardization
processes result in agreements concerning technical artifacts that are open to challenge at any
point of time; 2) standardization processes are complex and involve multiple heterogeneous
activities that include decision making and technical construction, 3) standardization processes
unfold over time, space and across diverse sets of actors who do not necessarily share similar
interests. We shall analyze three streams of standardization research that have sought to
understand standardization processes and their outcomes. In this context, standardization is
viewed in terms of either design tasks, social sense-making challenges or negotiation problems.
ICT Standardization as innovation and product development process. An obvious
approach to examining standardization is to view it as a form of design that results in innovation.
In this case, standardization theory can be derived from the literature dealing with innovation and
product development. The major question here is then, how should producers organize specific
activities so as to enable an effective design (innovation) of the technical specifications? Not
surprisingly, due to its close similarities to traditional R&D, many view ICT standardization
processes primarily as innovation processes (Miller and Morris 1999; Rothwell 1994), a linear
movement from basic research to product design, manufacturing and introduction (Miller and
Morris 1999). More recent models introduced overlapping stages and recognized the influential
role of external parties in affecting the process logic and outcomes. The strength of these models
is that they cover the whole innovation process from basic research to technology introduction.
The weakness of these models is that they lack the concepts needed to identify and analyze
intricate events that influence standardization outcomes. Hence, while such models are
analytically compelling, they fail to describe the emergent features of standardization that are
part of the standard setter’s experience (Autio 1997) and lack the concepts required to understand
the internal logic through which the process becomes enacted and subsequently results in
specific outcomes.
Another group of process models that lend themselves to analyzing standardization
processes are those in which product development is modeled as a sequence of phases that are
separated by gates representing go/no go decisions (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996; Cooper and
Kleinschmidt 1988; Cooper 1983, 1993). Such “water-fall” models have been widely adopted in
several engineering disciplines and have been particularly popular in ICT areas like software
engineering. (Iivari and Koskela 1987; Royce 1970) In these models, an ICT product is
observed as it is developed through a linear sequence of steps, though recently the need for
backtracking and recursion has been identified (Iivari 1990, 1990) when high uncertainty and
product volatility prevail. They do not, however, recognize the multiple stakeholders involved in
standardization and the need for finding a common ground for their standardization.
ICT Standardization as a decision problem. Another stream of research on
standardization has focused on events and rationalities, which guide standard related decisionmaking among a set of producers. This is driven by the questions, why did producers choose a
specific standard, and what would have been the most rational outcome for such a choice? Most
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of this is informed by economic theory. In economics, the early literature approached
standardization as a rational game between the involved actors (Besen and Farrell 1994). Based
on these game theoretic models, the actors’ decision to create a separate standard, or to join a
standardization initiative, was analyzed using utility models and drawing welfare implications
from alternative decision choices (Farrell and Saloner 1988). Another stream has been concerned
with the diffusion of ICT and the factors that explain the emergence of de facto standards as a
result of actors’autonomous decision-making. These models are often based on the notion of
increasing returns (Arthur 1989). They can describe how a specific ICT system gains a lead in
the installed base of the technology due to correct timing as well as random events. In the
management literature, research has focused on analogous problems of dominant design
competition and bandwagon processes (Tushman and Anderson 1986; Wade 1995). Both these
areas view standards as products that have entered in the market place. They consequently ignore
the ambiguity that precedes the decision phase. In both areas, scant attention has been paid to the
processes through which technology specifications emerge and to the factors that influence
search and discovery. The research has also largely neglected the subsequent processes of
getting the actors to decide which of these processes involves negotiation and enrollment.
Socio-technical studies of standardization.Relatively disconnected from the innovationdriven and economic literatures of standardization, a socio-technical literature has emerged
during the last two decades (Williams and Edge 1996; Hanseth, Monteiro, and Halting 1996)
often called the social construction of technology research (SCOT). This stream examines
standardization as a form of social interaction within a network of actors in which the technology
becomes introduced and stabilized in the social system. In this case, researchers have asked the
questions, why and how was a specific ICT standard created and what social and technical issues
influenced its creation? How did the involved actors understand the meaning of the design and
what reasons did they have for their enrollment in standardization processes? How did specific
actors become connected through artifacts and commitments during the process and why?
Accordingly, research in this stream analyzes why the standardization process follows one
trajectory while excluding others and attempts to answer why the standardized technology has
adopted its shape (Mangematin and Callon 1995).
These studies often trace down the decisions and commitments that actors had to make
when their alignment of interests was at stake in the use and introduction of the technology. Yet,
successful alignment is but one possible outcome of the negotiation (Callon, Latour, and Rip
1986; Callon and Law 1989; Latour 1993) and failures of technologies are likely to occur
because the network does not stabilize. Social-technical network literature thus complements the
economic literature and provides a processual account of the building of the socio-technical
network related to standardization actors. It pays attention to the necessary measures and
activities that can stabilize the network. At the same time, it often fails to provide an adequate
description of the cognitive and technical challenges related to standardization outcomes. It often
does not account for rationalities involved in actors’ decision making, i.e. why a specific choice
was made or how a design was produced.
Open issues in Standardization Research. Each research stream offers specific insights
into standardization. Innovation process models help analyze how activities become organized
over time and depict their inherent dynamism through the concepts of recursion and
backtracking. Decision theory helps analyze choice rationalities and how such choices in
specific sequences may result in different outcomes. Finally the socio-technical models raise the
issues of meaning, negotiation and actor enrollment. The strengths of each model can be
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integrated into a broader process model of standardization for a more faithful analysis. We must
accordingly identify activities that embrace all these dimensions of standardization. Moreover,
we need a way to organize these activities through the constructs that account for observed
variations in standardization processes.

Standardization as a Multi-Threaded Social Activity
Standardization as Design, Sense-Making and Negotiation
The standardization process by necessity includes the activities of design (D), sensemaking (S), and negotiation (N) and thereby needs to be analyzed as a process that results in a
specific design outcome that exhibits a technical “closure” (technical specification). This closure
is connected at all times to broader community level processes of creating significance structures
(sense-making) and aligning interests among actors that enter the standardization arena
(negotiation). These elements are outlined in Error! Reference source not found..

Attaching meaning to
design alternatives

Agreeing between designs,
fixing the actor network

Sense-making

Negotiation

Design

Creating and choosing design alternatives

Figure 1. Standardization Activities

First and foremost, developing a “technical specification” – a standard – is about
designing a technical artifact (D-element). The specification contained in the standard represents
the generation and evaluation of choice among technical alternatives and their
functionality/ability to reach a closure in the technical specification (Williams and Edge 1996).
For example, the design of a mobile phone standard involves the pain-staking process of
designing an overall architecture for the system, all interfaces and their functionality between
different components and their non-functional features (like reliability). The concept of
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standardization as design focuses on the cognitive tasks of how to articulate alternatives, make
choices among them and evaluate them under conditions of bounded rationality.
At the same time, any investigation of standardization needs to recognize its social and
community dependent nature. As the definition suggests, a standard is formed on the agreement
between two or more actors. For example, in the case of mobile phone standards, the actors must
observe who can or should enter into the agreement about the standard, why, and under what
conditions. Therefore, concepts mobilized in order to analyze standardization must describe
necessary social activities that identify and enroll actors (producers) and conditions under which
they can reach an agreement (Hanseth, Monteiro, and Halting 1996). Standardization studies
must describe interactions between actors that may or may not share joint interests. They also
have to demonstrate how the design of standards is contingent upon and influenced by the
surrounding and preceding social processes of “reaching an agreement.” This requires the
capability to provide reasons for doing so for each involved actor. Accordingly, we need to
conceptualize standardization in the “context” of design as a set of related activities that lead us
to understand what is articulated between actors and why and how they reach agreements as a
result of these communications.
Reaching an agreement on design requires that involved actors are able to make sense of
the designs, other actors and the environment. This we call the sense-making element (Selement). For example, in the case of mobile telephony actors must be able to foresee a world
where a mobile phone and its use make sense (is plausible) by some set of actors and at the same
time create meanings attached to that technology (like business-like, expression of freedom etc.).
Such sense-making implies that actors create and enact new frames of reference and significance
that will be attached to the technology. This process involves articulating and interpreting
beliefs, cognitive elements, standards of evaluation and behaviors that frame subsequent design
activity (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1993; Karnoe and Garud 2001). In addition, standardization
researchers must analyze how emerging designs and their interpretations between actors become
shaped and contested in negotiations due to actors’ conflicting interests (N-element). For
example, in the case of mobile telephony different actors may have different interests and
associated ideas regarding the extent to which mobile telephony is or should be different from
established modes of uses and meanings attached to wire-line telephony. Without the idea of
actors’ different “interests” and contrasting ways to make-sense there would be no need to
“reach” an agreement. Thus, standards as agreements entail that actors negotiate meanings
related to the technology and, during such negotiations, recognize and reconcile their diverging
interests. Hence, negotiation is needed as the third element of standardization activity.
It is important to understand that each activity (D, S, or N) is dependent upon the other
two. None of them can proceed without the support of other activities at an actor’s disposal:
discovering a new or deviating course of action through design is always subsumed within the
idea of a new interpretation of the design context and the obligation of getting others to agree to
go along with it. Hence, the focus on a designer’s cognitive design behavior in Simon’s (1977)
design model needs to be expanded in standardization analyses to include concepts of sensemaking within participating communities (Weick 1995) and negotiation where their interests are
continually aligned (Latour 1995). Successful standardization accordingly implies a closure in
each of the following: 1) obtaining a design contained in the standard that meets normal
requirements set for technical specifications and can embed novel technological elements; 2)
involved actors understand the standard and its implications for their going concerns and they
can imagine scenarios in which the standard is illustrated; and 3) involved actors reach an
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agreement that can stabilize and mobilize a socio-technical network implied by the standard.
Each one of these is, however, continually open to re-evaluation and challenge in terms of a
potentially better design, emergence of a novel and surprising meaning or an unexpected
breakdown where interests are not reconciled or actors do not agree. Such failures normally
imply that a new round of standardization involving design, sense-making and negotiation is
initiated to re-align all activities and their outcomes.
Standardization as an Emergent, Recursive Process
The three activities of standardization may become related in myriad ways. Concepts that
describe connections between activities must help organize them in a dynamic and hierarchical
order. We adopt recursion from Simon’s seminal work (1977) to provide a framework to
organize standardization activities. Simon describes recursion in decision-making as follows:
“problems at any given level generate sub-problems that, in turn, have their intelligence, design,
and choice phases, and so on” (Simon 1977, p.43). We can observe that he does not impose any
specific order in which the three activities are carried out. Second, the activities can be broken
down into any set of hierarchical levels that embed these three processes. Third, actors can
engage concurrently in several activities, jump back between them or omit some activities
entirely at certain moments. If we replace the intelligence, design and choice above with design,
sense-making and negotiation as the three recursively organized activities of standardization, we
ascertain that there is no specific order in which D-, S- and N elements can be organized.
Second, the outcome of any activity can be broken down into lower level activities which can
also serve as input to any other activity including the activity itself. This also implies direct
recursion. For example, one can design a design, or negotiate how to negotiate. Third, each actor
can be engaged in several activities at any point of time and withdraw from some of these
activities as well.
We show how this model can be integrated with the product oriented innovation models
of standardization. It provides examples of each standardization activity within each innovation
stage. The table also covers a product (or in our case standard) introduction and adoption step
called “Market Introduction and Adoption,” which addresses the need to understand customerrelated agreements that fit our definition of a standard.
The concept of inherent recursion of standardization activities has specific implications
for the analysis of standardization. First, during the analysis one of the activities is always placed
on the foreground while the others remain as a necessary backdrop. This covers the engaged
actors as well as the researchers analyzing the situation. This focus can be changed by the
involved actors and the observant researchers if required and generally results in a new and
different direction for the process. Hence, at each step (actors can make a choice and change the
direction of the process by changing the activity and the analysis must lead to the identification
of such moments and understand the occurrence of such outcomes. An additional feature of the
model is its indifference to the chosen units of analysis and granularity of activities that follows
from the hierarchical organization.
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Design
Decision to engage or to
retreat from design
Setting up the goals and
constraints that define the
design space

Sense-making
Creating a joint
understanding of why a
standard is beneficial to
different actors
Defining the meaning of the
technological
Artifacts embedded in the
standard

Negotiation
Reconciling the concept of
the standard with incentives
of the participating parties

Requirements
discovery

Setting the standards
requirements and functional /
architectural features

Reconciling actors’ technical
abilities with their vision of
the scope of the innovation

Resource
allocation

Resource planning and
commitment

Specifications
development

Designing the specifications
for each functionality and
feature of the specified
standard

Setting the scope of the
innovation and defining its
nature and functionality in
the possible use context
Developing a vision of
general resources needed and
developing a sense of the
complexity and uncertainty
involved
Making sense of
technological alternatives and
their implications for artifact
construction

Standard
implementation

Gaining commitment to
implement the standard
Prototypes and technology
trials
Alternative technology
evaluations

Creating a common
understanding with the
implementers about the
specifications and the vision
behind the specifications

Technology
introduction
based on
standard

Technology design and
introduction for large scale
uptake

Creating a vision of what the
product means for adopters

Initiation

Creating options on benefits'
and how resources are
distributed

Negotiating between
competing technical solutions
and resolving related IPRs
Enrolling allies to support
chosen design
Designing alternative
implementation plans and
negotiating implementation
paths
Enrolling different groups
that are necessary to get the
standard implemented
Developing and negotiating
business cases for adopters

Table 1. Standardization and Stage Models
Standardization as Design
Analyzing standardization from the view-point of design is critical to understanding how
standards qua technical specifications emerge. During the design phase, actors plan and commit
to a specific, new and innovative course of action. Such efforts can range from small design
steps, such as the design of a specification for a critical component in a GSM phone like a speech
codec to designs that involve a broad trajectory of innovation, e.g., the service model underlying
a GSM system. Every such step involves generating, evaluating and choosing between different
technical and (socio-technical) options (Williams and Edge 1996, p.866).
Accordingly, standardization as design involves “finding occasions for making a decision,
finding possible courses of action, choosing among courses of action” (Simon 1977) that are
continuously mediated by various representations of technical specifications (artifacts). Standard
producers seek to master the complexity of designs through a “divide and conquer” approach by
engaging in the following three phases of design: 1) intelligence - making sense of the
environment and attributing meaning to actions and conditions that call for a design decision; 2)
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design 3 - inventing, developing, and analyzing possible courses of action through crafting
technical specifications; 3) choice - selecting a particular course of action from those available
design options. For example, in the case of GSM, actors had to invent and analyze several
options for speech codes or coding methods and at some point make a choice between them. This
process was initiated by the need to meet specific envisioned needs that related to cost, speech
quality or other use parameters.
Design anticipates that during negotiation each actor weights design alternatives against a
set of criteria that may cover economic, political, social and technological criteria. These criteria
describe reasons an actor can give for choosing one option. At the same time they signal
reflective announcements of background sense-making processes. Such rationales may include
maximization of economic profits. For instance, during the choice whether to standardize or not,
an actor may consider whether intra technology competition will be more profitable than inter
technology competition (Besen and Farell 1994). From the viewpoint of negotiation, actors’
designs anticipate others’ designs and seek to change the selection criteria between designs. For
example, in the case of GSM, many proposals for specific components of the system like speech
codecs were at the same time responses to other existing proposals or attempts to develop new
criteria by which to evaluate these components.
While ultimately every actor has to individually commit to a design, in a multi-actor
setting, several mechanisms can be exploited to coordinate designs. For example, Farrell and
Saloner (1988) analyzed how market, committee and hybrid mechanisms support the
coordination of multiple actors. 4 This raises the need to distinguish between alternative design
modes that describe the governance mechanisms through which a design is produced (see also
Benkler 2001). The mechanism could be voting by majority, consensus, consent, etc. These can
be supported by structuring mechanisms that enable distribution design like modularity of
designs, their granularity or cost of communications (Benkler 2001). This links the design
continually with negotiation because there are specific arrangements and negotiation tactics that
can help reach and enforce agreement on designs.
Standardization as Sense-Making
Weick (1995) defines sense-making as a process of invention or the creation of a sense
that results from an individuals,’ or a community’s response to changes in an environment. For
him, sense-making is mostly re-active in that actors try to make sense of past events and
situations, thereby becoming oriented with the current environment. In the context of
standardization, this definition must be expanded because much of the sense-making in
standardization is proactive; it is about attributing a meaning to a not-yet-invented technology.
Much of this is based on proactive readings of past events and exposures to specific technologies
and their uses. But it is also a question of expanding the “horizon” (Gadamer 1975), an effort
that enables actors to become aware of the prejudices they bring to encounters with the
technology. As a result, they become aware of these prejudices, begin to expand their limits of

3

Simon calls this design as his model is driven by the decision making metaphor. On some occasions, however, he
equates decision making with design so there is no contradiction in using the term design in the first meaning.
4
The episodes and locations of design can also change. In most cases of open or inter-organizational
standardization, some design is carried out by individual actors within the organization while some design can be
carried out within the standardization meetings and committees or in specific locations that have been established to
carry out the design. This analysis is, however, beyond the scope of the paper.
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the language and thinking and ultimately become open to new meanings that can be attributed to
the technology. Hence, sense-making in standardization is about reading the history of
experiences and encounters with technology in a new context which calls for new sense-making
and the creation of a new technological and social world.
In the context of standardization, sense-making results in creating and enacting novel
frames of reference and meaning in relation to potential and produced designs, processes, or
actors. It comprises transforming and renouncing beliefs, cognitive elements, behaviors and
standards of evaluation (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1993; Karnoe and Garud 2001); it is a
mindful deviation from established frames of reference (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2000).
Actors also constantly rationalize what they are doing in relation to this image based on
conflicting and uncertain information (Weick 1993, p.635; Latour 1995; Callon 1986).
During standardization, meanings are ambiguous and fluid. The standard can accordingly
take varying shapes and drastically change over time (Garud and Karnøe 2001). These
significations embody ideas about a possible space of design. For example, with mobile phones
such significations involved establishing a new vision of wireless service that consisted of
mobile phones, antennas, switches, batteries and telephony networks (Haug 2002) that deviated
significantly from the established model of wire-line telephony. These technologies had to be
associated with visions of their future use that, in the early stages, involved scenarios of using the
mobile telephony through the same use process as traditional telephony with the additional
feature of supporting mobility across networks (Haug 2002). This was later on replaced and
expanded with radically different use scenarios like personal telephone numbers, separation of
telephone terminals and service etc. At the same time, the economic implications of planned
wireless systems had to be envisioned based on future technology that did not currently exist.
The creation of such scenarios expands alternative design spaces, thus creating permanent
tensions within the dominant design framework ((Fransman 1999) calls these visions).
Sense-making takes place in all stages of standardization including the adoption and use
of the technology due to its “interpretive flexibility” (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1993). The need
for interpretation, the creation of a new sense of what the technology is about and what its
economic implications are dominate the early phases of standardization. Later negotiations,
surprises and novel technological opportunities, use experiences and economic information force
actors to continuously question their established frame and continuously develop new readings.
Standardization as Negotiation
Standardization involves developing a new repertoire for technology use, for assigning
roles to others in such repertoires, and for trying to in Latour’s term(Latour 1995) enroll them .
When these repertoires are formulated, relationships with others must be re-evaluated. It takes
place whenever an actor positions himself (or itself) to be a part of the network that results from
standardization or tries to become disassociated from it, i.e., their identities and roles become
constantly re-negotiated and redefined. Actors need therefore to continually rethink, or make
sense of,, their relationships with others so that the network implied by the standard permits its
mobilization (Hanseth, Monteiro, and Halting 1996). Thus, mobilizing or “performing” the
actor-network as a part of a sense-making process creates the negotiation space for actors in
which they relate the designs to actors and to their different interpretations of the technology
(Callon 1986; Latour 1995). By establishing sufficient commonality in interests and thereby
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mobilizing the actor-network often demands the ability to compromise 5 , and thereby reach an
agreement (Weick 1995, p.43) in the form of a standard. During negotiation actors bargain the
distribution of future inputs and outputs to reach an agreement in relation to the designs that have
emerged. This normally takes the form of choosing specific designs, identifying associated
intellectual property rights and their nature (see e.g., Bekkers 2001) and agreeing on the
normative framework that defines commitments and obligations of different parties. Such
negotiation involves, at the same time, the capability to envision, connect and fix a sociotechnical network, which “inscribes” the chosen agreement (Latour 1995) and distributes and
maintains specific rights and obligations for different actors and their relationships to
technology. For example, in the case of wireless technology standardization, agreements on
specific compatibility requirements in critical network interfaces (terminal, base station, switch,
backbone network connection and switch) have to be agreed upon in the technical specification.
Concurrently, associated property rights and their implications for the possible commitments,
obligations and rights of different parties must be observed. This implies that all actors who had
an interest over those interfaces including regulators (frequencies and radio interface), terminal
manufacturers, telecommunication manufacturers, chip-makers, operators and wire-line system
standard developers have to be enrolled and a specific normative framework defining their
relationships must be established 6 .
Each actor seeks to maximize his benefits in “coming to an agreement” that during sensemaking was only imagined, but now has to be embedded into the material and social network.
But because the envisioned world implicated by the imagined solutions is not real or fixed, it is
continually up for grabs: “The entities identified and the relationships envisaged have not been
yet tested. The scene is set for a series of trials of strength whose outcomes will determine the
solidity of … the problematization” (Callon 1986, p.207). These trials of strength translate the
concerns of one world into those of another and then discipline the translation in order to
stabilize a socio-technical network (Star 1991).
Empirical Investigation of Standardization Using D-, S-, N Model
We will now analyze three standardization cases in the telecommunication industry. The
goals of this analysis are threefold. First, we want to show that standardization processes can be
broken down into D-S-N activities and involve a dynamic interplay between one another.
Empirical evidence from the cases helps illustrate the detailed working of design, sense-making,
and negotiation in standardization efforts. Second, we want to show that, by applying the D-S-N
model, we can analyze standardization processes in terms of complexity and recursion. We seek
to illustrate how a singular D- activity can be expanded to include complex recursive process
structures. Third, the case studies enable us to contrast real world standardization processes with
normative process models of standardization that often depict standardization processes as linear.

5

From the viewpoint of game theory not all standardization negotiations are zero-sum games and hence there is not
always a need to compromise or make trade-offs.
6
This does not exclude the possibility that in some situations the process evolves as quid pro bono and is based on
what Benkler (2001) calls “peer production,” which has been widely adopted in the open source community. This
would be one different kind of normative framework with different types of normative implications.
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Methodology
Our use of case studies was motivated by both our concern for process analysis and
simultaneous theory building. While in this paper we present the cases as illustrations of the
model we developed, the research process more closely followed grounded theory methods. We
developed our theoretical arguments through the interplay of data and theory. Our research
concern was in explaining and understanding highly complex processes that unfold over several
years. The case based method is uniquely suited to capture the richness and complexity of such
processes (Yin 1994).
We selected three cases of standardization from the wireless telecommunications domain.
This domain was chosen since it often combines elements of formal standardization and de facto
standardization. For the purpose of this study, we selected the standardization of the analogue
Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) system and the digital GSM standard, which were the main
wireless telephone standardization efforts in Europe. The third example deals with the
development of the short-range radio standard called Bluetooth. This standardization initiative
had its origins in the independent efforts of several wireless phone manufacturers to develop
short-range data transfer capability.
Our cases thoroughly cover various standardization modes on a continuum ranging from
market driven de-facto standardization to committee driven standardization. The three cases
differ significantly also in the complexity of the technology involved, the number of industries,
individuals and firms enrolled and the timeframe assigned to each case. Furthermore, the three
processes cover the last three decades, namely, the 70s, 80s and 90s, during which organizational
structures of standardization organizations and participating actors have changed significantly.
This has inevitably led to changes in the underlying processes, including the inter- and intraorganizational standardization processes. For a more detailed description of these cases, see
appendix 1. Key features of each case are outlined in Error! Reference source not found..

Case
1. NMT
2. GSM
3. Wireless
link

Type of
standard/fora
Committee, de-facto
Committee, de-jure
Alliance, de-facto

Size of fora 7 ,
persons
10-30
30-100
15

Cultural settings
Nordic, homogeneous
European, heterogeneous
Cross-continental,
heterogeneous

Time frame,
years
10+
10+
2

Table 2. Cases Summary
We collected a rich data set on these cases through several methods. First we conducted
multiple interviews with managers 8 , who were either key decision makers or standardization
specialists. In addition to interview data, written documents, memos and public announcements
from firms involved in the standardization cases were collected and analyzed. Finally, we
utilized secondary data from industry analysts and trade publications. These additional data
sources were used to triangulate findings from interviews whenever possible. Concepts were
used to interpret data and develop an account of the observed behaviors and outcomes. This
7

Number of people in technical committee, responsible for specifications' development
For instance, in the cases of the NMT and GSM cellular telephone systems, former chairmen of the standardization
committees were interviewed. For confidentiality reasons, we cannot disclose all the names of the managers
interviewed.

8
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strategy of inductive theory discovery, coupled with the continuous interpretation of observations
through the lenses of outlined theories, allows the development of a detailed theoretical account
of the phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967) that is analytically generalizable.
Standardization Analysis Using the D-S-N Model
Standardization Processes can be broken into Design, Sense-Making, and Negotiation
Activities. Our model suggests that each activity is essential for standardization. Sometimes they
overlap, while in other instances, they can be clearly separated. Bluetooth provides an example
of a situation where design, sense-making, and negotiation took place concurrently. During the
early stages of the standardization process several manufacturers realized that this technology
could become important for other mobile device manufacturers as well. Independent of each
other two mobile phone manufacturers contacted a semiconductor manufacturer to discuss the
possibility to develop a standard that one could utilize across industry boundaries. Facilitated by
the semiconductor manufacturer the two competitors realized that cooperation would enable a
creation of a standard would have enough weight in the market. As one interviewee observed:
“With Ericsson we work in the same business area – the phones and the cellular terminal devices.
We didn’t go to each other to start it. We went originally both to INTEL. But what was important
in forming the consortium, all the companies who joined had developed the vision that in order to
make this really successful, we would need to have a common and open standard for it. Something
that is proprietary for one company well it might gain some market and it would bring some
benefits to that company but it would not really make it widely adopted.“

Based on this sense-making, the three companies started negotiations about whom else to
include in the standardization work. Different alternatives were considered to trade-off the
difficulties of negotiating a standard with a large number of companies while at the same time
ensuring wide industry acceptance. The three initial companies chose that the standard should be
created by a small network to avoid problems of having to negotiate details of the standard with
a large number of actors. This would delay the process and make it more difficult to “perform
the network”.. This decision led these companies to invite additional companies from the
portable PC market to join the consortium. 9 The choice of these companies showed how they
related their sense-making and attribution of the significance of the technology to their own
interests of getting it accepted and move it fast into the market.
The simultaneous need for integrating negotiation and a design space into the
standardization effort shows how technological, social, economic and political rationales became
intertwined through the intersections of the three activities. The two computer companies that
joined early on the consortium were selected not only for their technological and market
strength, but also for their good relationships with the semiconductor company. In the words of
one interviewee:
“Certainly these two companies are driving the technology and the new features in their devices.
One thing of course is that they have good and direct links with INTEL. They are important

9

Also other manufacturers where contacted to participate in the standardization effort but they ultimately declined.
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customers for INTEL. There are other companies who are using AMD chips for example - buying
chips from INTEL’s archrival. I think that these companies, if I know it right, are also good
friends of INTEL. In that sense they are politically correct.”

Whereas technological strength and design capability clearly plays a key role in the
choice of actors – the early configuration of the actor network –, their impact on the economic
viability of the future standard, their current economic and social ties and the avoidance of
political conflict in the alliance all strongly affected the final choice.
While the above example shows how sense-making, negotiation and design become
seamlessly fused, the following vignette that Thomas Haug — a secretary of the NMT group and
later a chairman of the GSM committee— recalls shows how these three activities had to
sometimes be separated in order to allow progress towards closure in standardization. Based on
the results of the early sense-making process, NMT developers had to refine their specifications:
“We realized that we would probably have a lot of mistakes, when we wrote specifications, so we
sent out some early versions. And we invited the suppliers to the discussions. It was not very
successful – it was a total failure! It was [a failure] because we invited all the manufacturers at
once to a big meeting. We presented our ideas to them, and got no questions. Because, of course
the fact we had not thought of, that no one would really run the risk of disclosing to his competitor
what he was thinking of. But later on, we started to invite them one by one. And that was very
fruitful… And after each meeting we issued a new set of questions and answers, without
mentioning who put the questions to us. And we gave a list of answers that we’ll give them. And
that was the information they had.”

In this quotation, the negotiations about technical details had to be separated from sensemaking in terms of their meanings for different companies and the resulting configuration of the
actor-network. To achieve this separation, the information exchange was later on organized in a
way that enabled the system developers to crosscheck any particular technological solution for
feasibility with other manufacturers while avoiding disclosure of immediate answers. Thus, those
meetings were a punctuated series of design and negotiation processes aimed at refining the
standard based on the outcomes of initial sense-making processes.
Design, Sense-making, and Negotiation can unfold in a Non-linear Fashion. We argued
above that D,S,N sequences do not necessarily unfold in a linear fashion. Rather, any activity can
trigger any other activity. In the following vignette, the standardization committee had to resolve
conflict over different radio coding and air interface solutions. These decisions form the
cornerstone of any wireless telephony solution and are thus a seed for both technical and political
maneuvering. In 1987, the GSM group reached an impasse between a Franco-German radio
coding method and a Nordic design 10 . This choice implied different tradeoffs between quality
and the cost for user terminals and suggested a significant impact on the network architecture
and cost. French and German PTT representatives privately favored the Nordic plan because it
made sense from the viewpoint of trading between quality and cost. Yet, their governments
opposed this choice due to the R&D investment made by French and German governments and
manufacturers in the specific technology option proposed. Due to the dispute over the coding
methods and air interfaces, the whole standardization process came to a halt for nearly six

10

It must be noted that the radio coding method is an essential part of a standardization process as it affects the
efficiency and voice quality of the radio link (circuit) between the mobile terminal and the base station.
©2005 Sprouts 3(1), pp 29-60, http://sprouts.case.edu/2003/030102.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-10

43

FOMIN, KEIL AND LYYTINEN/THEORIZING ABOUT STANDARDIZATION

months. The Franco-German technology option, however, was abruptly abandoned when
Germany changed its position and endorsed the Nordic plan (Manninen et al. 2000):
“In February 1987 we had a meeting, which ended in disagreement. Germans and French wanted a
wide-band system, and the rest of the Europe wanted a narrow-band system… The technical
people in GSM agreed we should have this narrow-band system. It was in interest of
compatibility. But political people dictated the opinions of PTTs. And they had a lot of political
reasons. They’ve spent a lot of money on the experimental systems and they wanted something to
get for their money”…

In the quotation above we see how parties, while engaged in the negotiation of
technological designs, attempt to enroll allies and use powerful fixers. This negotiation triggers
sense-making related to investments made during the resource allocations that took place earlier.
The continuation of this vignette shows how, after new sense-making and bringing new
rationalities into the table that helped to overcome the earlier fixated reading of the situation, a
new round of negotiations took place so that the process could achieve closure (Manninen and
Fomin 1999):
“In June 1987 all these difficulties had been resolved, The German and the French ministers had
met. They had agreed, after some gambling perhaps, that in the interests of compatibility in
Europe, we could not possibly have a French-German system [which would be different from the
rest of Europe] right in the middle of the continent… And then in order to give them something
for their money, we agreed to switch from one mode to another mode for digital transfer. It was a
face-saving, I think.”

The example above also shows how economic, political and technical criteria figure into
agreements while actors have shifted flexibly between D-, S- and N- activities. While the
narrow-band solution was clearly superior from the technological and cost perspectives, it
entailed economical losses of investments in R&D carried out by German and French companies.
The switch to another mode for digital transfer – a design compromise made during the
negotiations – made this decision politically bearable. These compromises were necessary
simply because the multilateral maximization of all benefits is not possible – even in the case of
competing technological designs. Another important implication of the example is that the
choice that is seemingly a minor part of a design creates important path dependencies for the
later designs (Liebowitz and Margolis 2000).
To Proceed the Cycle of Design, Sense-Making, and Negotiation needs to be Complete. Any
standardization process must successfully reach closure in order to become a standard.
Moreover, this must occur for all three activities. Standard makers (what is the antecedent of
“that?” Unclear what you mean here) must also reach closure at any specific stage of
standardization if they want to proceed. For instance, the initial resource allocation sense-making
efforts center on forming an understanding of what resources and skills are necessary to develop
a standard in terms of the size of the project and the type of resources needed. Bluetooth
standardization provides a good example of how such sense-making takes place. Early on, the
original founders of the Bluetooth alliance discussed which partner should enter the core to
ensure the effective development of specifications. Based on the technological vision (sensemaking) that Bluetooth would constitute an initiative that would cut across industry boundaries,

©2005 Sprouts 3(1), pp 29-60, http://sprouts.case.edu/2003/030102.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-10

44

FOMIN, KEIL AND LYYTINEN/THEORIZING ABOUT STANDARDIZATION

the firms were trying to find a structure that would provide necessary resources, but keep the
actual implementation arrangement simple. The following quote underscores this:
“Of course there was the discussion what is the optimum size for this kind of consortium. First, it
has to be so big and it has to have so strong players that it really has the market and has the weight
on the media and all those things that are important. Second, if it is very big at the beginning there
is the threat that it makes the actual work more difficult and more bureaucratic. If in every meeting
there are representatives of twenty companies it quickly turns out that each of them has different
interests and conflicting interests and so it’s making the progress of the actual standard slower.
The idea was that there had to be players from the different parts of the game so from the telecom
and from the computing industry. And players which are strong enough that their market shares in
their business area is big enough so that it has a real meaning when the standard is finalized.”

Resource allocation not only requires developing a common understanding of what
resources are needed but also must lead to the actors taking on roles and committing to
contribute the required resources. This endeavor requires a negotiation process in which the
resource requirements are matched not only with the resources and capabilities of the actors, but
also with their preferences. In the Bluetooth case, for instance, Intel opted to act as the process
facilitator due to its longstanding experience with de-facto standardization initiatives. In contrast,
Ericsson was prominent during the market introduction phase as a result of the larger amount of
available resources. To be able to proceed, the actors need to commit resources then decide if the
outcome of the negotiation process is sufficient to proceed.
D-S-N are Recursively Organized. As noted above, D-S-N activities can be decomposed
themselves recursively into sense-making, negotiation and design cycles. The practice of
representing standardization processes as recursive processes allows us to scale our analysis
using different levels of detail. While the overall design, sense-making, or negotiation cycle is
simple in its structure, further breaking up the activities allows for the development of complex
and fine-grained descriptions.
The recursive nature of design, sense-making, and negotiation can be seen in the
following example from the NMT standardization. The NMT group was formed during a Nordic
Teleconference held in June 1969 in Kabelvåg of Norway, during which time Sweden, without
any prior notice, announced its intention to start developing a system for mobile services. This
proposal was accepted during the same meeting as a Pan-Nordic initiative. The short
initialization stage left many organizational and technical questions open. The primary goal of
the group, according to the mandate, was not to design an integrated technical product, but to
create a common and compatible Nordic service. Because of its broad scope, the service was
open to negotiation for an extended period, while different alternatives for the service concept
and its technical feasibility were designed and negotiated.
A critical issue in the service-related design was whether the system should be manual or
automatic. To make the choice, several viable design alternatives had to be developed and
subsequently negotiated among the participants. Developing these alternatives required sensemaking of what manual or automatic systems would mean in terms of service, cost and
technological implementation and its feasibility. Toivola (1992) recalls that although the starting
point in the requirements was that the network should be automatic, the committee had to ensure
that this option would be realistic. Designing an automatic system was not something taken for
granted in the early 70s and estimating the costs associated with such a system was anything but
straightforward. Both manual and automatic alternatives were designed while the actors derived
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probable system configurations and estimated their costs, finally choosing two alternatives that
could be compared in terms of cost and technical requirements.
“Six years after the original decision, the requirements were fixed when in its report in January
1975 the NMT work group analyzed the cost of both manual and automatic networks. A difference
of SEK 3 million was found to favor of the automatic system. Ultimately, the choice [of automatic
system] made by the NMT group shaped its success when it was introduced in the beginning of
1980s in that this choice proved was crucial for roaming.” (Manninen et al. 2000)

The above vignette shows how within the design, sense-making, and negotiation cycle,
the negotiation aspect can be broken down into another design, sense-making, and negotiation
cycle (or two for each alternative).
Comparing D-S-N and Linear Standardization Models. Our suggestion that design, sensemaking, and negotiation do not always unfold in a linear manner can be extended to
standardization processes at large. Bluetooth provides an example of how at the first meeting of
the core companies of the Bluetooth alliance, sense-making was occurring that affected the
whole standardization process. In the meeting, managers created a common understanding of the
cornerstones for process initiation, resource allocation and market introduction (see quotation on
p.42), and concluded that, to achieve efficient development, a small group of standard sponsors
would be ideal, but such sponsors should be from both the telecommunications and computer
industries:
“And we were looking for companies, which would hold enough market share in their business
area that they could pull the market but that we could also survive with only these on board. We
started from an assumption what if these are the only companies that are actually going to use it, is
still so widely deployed that even these companies would make it successful on the market. When
it is successful on the market then there are probably other companies joining the game.”

This vignette shows how standardization can unfold in a non-linear fashion. It further
shows that the processes of standards design and negotiation and the diffusion of artifacts based
on those agreements are tightly interwoven and cannot (and should not) be separated in the
analysis. Our cases suggest that the concept of separating design, sense-making and the
negotiation of standards implicit in the normative standardization process does not reflect the
actual standardization processes. Consequently, this makes them less useful in explaining why
specific standardization processes succeed or fail. This is not to say that linear process models
are useless, rather they are boundary objects used for sense-making and negotiating resource
allocation and coordination tasks.
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Discussion
A process theory of standardization, outlined above enables us to theorize over
standardization processes and their outcomes. In the following, we shall pick up four issues
related to standardization theory: 1) features of the proposed theory and its relationship to
existing theoretical frameworks; 2) how this theory compares to current process accounts in
standardization; 3) an analysis of the timing issues of standardization related to the theory; and 4)
alternative uses of the D-S-N model in the study of standardization.
Nature of D-S-N theories
Process Theories
We believe that investigations that draw upon these notions help formulate empirical
accounts that are more faithful to available empirical evidence and can provide more rigorous
analyses of why and how emergent standardization processes come into being. They also provide
a means of analyzing standardization episodes in a flexible and comprehensive manner, which
helps cast our conceptual net widely and allows us to capture nuances of specific standardization
episodes.
Theoretical formulations and models built upon these concepts can produce process
theories (Mohr 1982; Markus and Robey 1988). These accounts are not state oriented variance
theories, which are capable of defining necessary and sufficient reasons for Y to happen given X,
i.e., X always precedes Y, or causes Y to happen. In such variance theories, it is also assumed
that the outcome will invariably occur when the necessary conditions are present and sufficient.
Such conditions are normally framed in terms of variables and dressed in an inference on the
order of, if X then Y, if more X then more Y. Process theories, instead, analyze episodes of
discrete events or outcomes X1, X2, X3,.. X n in a manner, which shows that a string of specific set
of events X2, X3,.. X n is necessary for a specific outcome Yi, but that these conditions are not
sufficient in that such outcomes may not occur given the sequence of events. Moreover, there
can be other sets of events X1, X2, and X3 that can yield the same outcome. For example, some
wireless standards have become widely successful through very different configurations of
events. There are some fundamental elements to all of them, such as changes in regulations
systems (competition), the market focus in standard specification and service introduction and
the timing of agreement with relation to technological development (not too early, not too late).
Yet, no set of conditions can be said to be at the same time both necessary and sufficient to
produce successful standards.
Another way to build process theories is to focus on the lack of specific events in specific
episodes that do not result in Yi. From this we can infer that if there is not an X2, X3,.. X n we
will not produce Yi. For example, a lack of market feedback and a purely technological focus
(i.e. lack of sense-making or wrongly focused sense-making) in standardization processes have
always resulted in standardization failures. Whereas the first group of process theories is mostly
retrospective- they help explain why something occurred as it did, the second group will also
allow for weak forms of prediction in the sense that we can, in most cases, exclude certain
outcomes if certain conditions are not met. This, however, cannot be extended into a strong
explanation in a form similar to, if X then Y or if more X then more Y. For example, more sensemaking or more market focus will not necessarily lead to a successful standard. Hence, an
important element in analyzing such event sequences is to identify random events and chance
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(serendipity), or a specific sequencing of events, which change the trajectory (Arthur 1989) of
the process. Therefore, outcomes in such theories are predictable from the knowledge of
processes, which are in our case framed as combinations and configurations of D, S, and N
events over time.
A second type of analysis that can be carried out with the process models is to analyze
what specific sets of events {X2, X3,.. X n}, {X1, X2, X3} are likely to be associated with specific
outcomes Yi. For example, our analysis showed that the only sufficient condition for achieving a
successful standardization outcome was to reach a closure in three activities: D, S, and N. Over
time, these analyses can obtain patterns of configurations through identifying a common set of
events {X1, X2} that co-exist in sequences of events. A third type of analysis in which we can
engage is to try to understand why X n happened when X k had happened before. This may
expand the analysis to include descriptions of states and their configurations which explain why
X n happened instead of X m after X k had happened before. For example, both NMT, and GSM
standardization processes were successful while some other standardization processes like CNET
in Germany or PDC in Japan were not (Lyytinen and Fomin 2002). In all these cases a closure
was achieved in D-activities (the systems worked and could be implemented), but these were
associated with very different prior configurations of S and N activities due to institutional
traditions and industry organizations. These different configurations lead over time to different
standardization process outcomes.
Features of D-S-N Theories
In our view, a good standardization process theory should be able to explain why a
specific outcome did emerge (success or failure) and why other alternatives were excluded. It
enables us to compose a story about why acts, events and structure were organized in the way
they were and how they co-produced the outcome. We can formulate our explanations with some
level of causality in that we can argue what comes first, how it affects what will follow (Sutton
and Staw 1995) and how timing will affect the process. The theory helps reveal underlying
processes in order to explicate systematic reasons of why something did occur. As noted, we can
also use it predict why something did not occur given the circumstances.
There is no best way to develop a theory. Its features depend on the nature of causality
assumed, its scope and the specific goals of the researchers (Weick 1984). Consequently,
theories differ significantly with respect to the dimensions of accuracy, generality, simplicity,
explanatory power, and completeness. Here, there are important tradeoffs to make. As Weick
(1984, p. 116) notes, no theory can meet all these criteria simultaneously: “General accurate
theories are complex, general simple theories are inaccurate, and simple accurate theories have
no generality.”
We show how theories based on D-S-N constructs meet these criteria. As can be seen in
the table, D-S-N based theories are quite distinct and complementary to the existing theoretical
analyses of standardization. These theories usually aim to be general, complex and have varying
modes of accuracy. Conversely, theoretical analyses derived from D-S-N seek to be accurate,
scalable and operate with general and few concepts. They have low empirical generalizability
and their additional downside is that they yield complex models and analyses due to their process
and constructive nature. They offer answers to questions of “why” and “how.”
Overall, we feel that the theory effectively meets the criteria for the specific theory
choice in the context of developing process theories of standardization. We have traded
generality against accuracy and simplicity in response to the need to understand and explain
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complex processes. In terms of theoretical orientation and the nature of organizing concepts, our
theoretical position is closest to the position adopted in the social construction of the
technologies research stream. In this regard, there is a deeper sense of theorizing. to which we
aspire here, that we call substantive or ontological theorizing. Such modes of theorizing help us
to understand the ingredients that make something possible or workable in the way that Simon’s
theory of decision making (Simon 1977) explains what makes decision-making possible. It has a
rather small predictive capability, but carries strong normative implications of what one should
not do.
Theory
feature
Accuracy

Description

D-S-N based theory

The extent to which the theory describes
in detail variations and specific features
of the studied phenomena
The extent to which the theory applies to
the whole population (Analytical
generality). The extent to which the
observations and findings are generalized
over the whole sample of possible
observations (Empirical generality).
How many concepts and their
relationships are embedded in the theory.
Are these concepts distinct, well defined
and intuitively clear?

Better than existing standardization theories. Helps
formulate more detailed and close-up models of
standardization processes and their outcomes 11 .
Good analytical generality
Weaker empirical generality due to small sample
sizes and causality logic
Enables scaling with complexity and yields higher
degrees of generality with complex models
(recursivity, hierarchical organization)
Based on few simple concepts
Organizing principles and relationships are
complex and the main challenge is theory
development
Can yield complex theoretical models from these
simple and few concepts 12
Challenge is to integrate good descriptive
indicators and data points with each component
The main components integrate and organize
heterogeneous streams of theory and research

Explanatory
power

Can the theory define necessary and
sufficient conditions for something to
happen (strong)?
Can the theory identify sufficient
conditions for something to happen
(weak)?

Completeness

To what extent does the theory cover all
necessary elements to explain why A was
produced in all possible circumstances?

Weak explanatory power
Denies possibility for prediction in the strict sense
(if A then B). A is only necessary for B to happen
Enables explanatory accounts of why something
happened when a set of events was identified
Enables statistical generalizability over a set of
process patterns, which lead to specific outcomes
No clear criteria to judge completeness
Institutions (stable configurations of actor
networks) and power (the way in which actors can
be influenced in the network) are implicit in the
model.

Generality

Simplicity

Table 3. General Features of D-S-N Theories

11

The model is in fact an outcome of the frustration we felt when trying existing standardization process models,
which could not explain the phenomena we observed.
12
This is in clear contrast to most existing standardization models, which yield relatively simple (linear) models out
from several and complex concepts.
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A Comparison with Current Accounts of Standardization Processes
As pointed out above, current standardization research separates standard design as the
production of a technical specification, its choice as an economic or political game, and its
diffusion in the market place as driven by economic or managerial prerogatives. These are
treated as conceptually distinct, separate and necessarily distinguishable moments in the
standardization. The basis of our theory denies the possibility of such separation for other than
limited analytical purposes. Therefore, current theoretical analyses of standardization should also
be more aware of the obvious limitations of this standing. Such separate analyses often ignore,
in particular, the necessary sense-making related to both design and negotiation situations, which
is largely driven by the actors’ market perceptions. For example, AT&T (King and West 2002)
failed to move successfully with wireless standardization and implementation despite its deep
pockets and technological lead. This was caused by the fact that Ma Bell’s management
consistently perceived the market place through the lenses of universal (wireline) service that
were driven by the need to sustain its monopoly rights. Despite this, its technology design
(AMPS) was the most widely used 1st generation wireless standard and adopted by other
aggressive entrants like McCaw.
Another issue in this study is to reveal the fragility of all three closures: design closure;
significance closure; and negotiation closure. This fragility can be caused by a numerous factors
and events that change designs, yield new interpretations, and transform interests and power
balances. Because of this fragility, we face high rates of standardization failures and suffer crises
in traditional standardization bodies that are not designed to address such levels of process
complexity and uncertainty.
Timing of Standardization Processes
Several empirical studies of standardization episodes and processes suggest that the
timing of events in reaching an agreement over the technical specification and the way in which
this agreement is translated into a socio-technical network are of critical importance in the
success of standardization (Haug 2002; Lyytinen and Fomin 2002; King and West 2002). Yet,
most theoretical work on standardization research has not accounted for this observation.
Economics and management literature has looked at standard choices from the viewpoint of a
singular adopter and analyzed his or her welfare functions in light of network externalities. This
approach largely ignores the actual processes of reaching an agreement (Farrell and Saloner
1986; David and Greenstein 1990). Likewise, most social construction of technology literature
does not include the concepts that capture standardization processes as dynamic phenomena.
Instead, it reduces processes to sense-making failures and identifies the specific qualities that
influence the process outcomes (Williams and Edge 1996; Pinch and Bijker 1987). Finally,
negotiation literature analyzes mostly static features such as the strength of the network, but pay
only limited attention to the dynamics involved in creating the network. We believe that the D-SN model more effectively highlights time related activities that build these socio-technical
networks and leads to analysis of patterns of activities and their relationships.
The most interesting issue in time based analyses seems to be how time scales and events
unfold along each set of activities and how they are co-related. Typical questions we could ask
include the following: How and when do different and deviating meanings for technology begin
to emerge? How and when do specific designs, technologies and architectures emerge, and how
do they enroll specific technical communities? How and when do these become stabilized in
designs that enter negotiations arenas and how do the socio-technical networks become
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stabilized? How are all these events synchronized, if at all? Though social construction of
technology literature has analyzed many of these issues from a specific standpoint, it has not so
far investigated the dynamics and time related aspects of the standardization. There is some
analysis of critical events and time points when gatekeepers and their powers are highlighted
(Latour 1995). These models are clearly still limited in outlining the dynamics of
standardization. They ignore what actors actually know and how they make sense of the
standards in specific time points in relation to markets or technological evolution. They also
assume that actors know the other actors and their agendas. Our model suggests that such
assumptions in most cases are untenable because sense-making is always frail. One way to
address such issues is to ask the following: What are the limits of sense-making and is there
some reasonable closure in a specific time frame with a given set of actors? How dynamic is the
set of actors and can they agree on the standard due to differences in their cognitive framing and
interests? What are their choice rationales and will they change or can they be negotiated during
the process? This poses specific dilemmas for actors who are engaged in standard negotiation.
When they enter the negotiation game too early it is easy to agree as the actors do not know to
what they are agreeing. This may not necessarily be important, but it is difficult to make choices
as technology does not make sense ; if actors enter too late it is easy to make sense but difficult
to agree as the actors’ agendas can vary, the technology is fixed and the sense-making has been
closed. There are also different ways to affect the final design like influencing sense-making,
influencing others’ goals and utility functions or using power and increasing dependencies.
Future Applications of D-S-N Model to Analyze Standardization
The outlined standardization model above is not a governing law theory about
standardization but suggests a narrative of standardizations (DiMaggio 1995). It neither explains
nor excludes everything. Rather, it merely suggests a set of concepts and their relationships along
with a set of analytical implications that we deem necessary and fruitful in theorizing about
standardization processes. More specific standardization theories would imply a set of specific
types of relationships between specific sets of D-, S-, N- configurations and specific outcomes.
This may require refinement and expansion of concepts and a further formulation of specific
constructs. At the same time, further theorizing requires the development of specific
relationships between observed phenomena and their change. We see, however, that suggested
concepts can serve multiple useful roles in developing such process theories.
First, they can be used to develop more specific process analysis frameworks to analyze
standardization processes as non-linear, emergent, and path-dependent processes. Specific
issues that can be addressed include the following: what types of non-linearity can be observed?
Do the specific constellations of the activities refer to tipping effects as observed in
organizational complexity theory (Axelrod and Cohen 2000)? How can these configurations be
related to observed non-linear models in the innovation literature (Autio 1997)? What conditions
and configurations standards create major deviations from existing dominant designs and create
new forms of path dependency (Karnoe and Garud 2001)? How are paths and path creation
activities reflected in process mappings? (These may first involve development of technical skills
and solutions and related technical architectures and specifications as design path. Second they
may entail invention, , transformation and sharing of cognitive schemata over time as a sensemaking path, and third creation of of practices, histories and trust among set of standard
adopters and producers as a negotiation path. Finally standardization implies development of
“rules of the game” that govern how standards become “standards” on the institutional path.
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Second, the concepts can be used to formulate process theories that explain the failures
or successes of standardization processes. The concepts of D-S-N can be used to analyze
specific standardization episodes. Researchers can pose the following questions: How did these
activities become patterned and how do these patterns relate to standardization success or
failure? This research would be similar to attempts to develop process theories of organizational
change or IT implementation (Mohr 1982; Markus and Robey 1988).
Third, D-S-N concepts can be used to understand, critique, and expand standardization
process models from the view point of D-S-N closures. Existing process accounts of
standardization are both normative and linear. They are based either on product development
models or regulation metaphors adopted from multilateral negotiations (Schmidt and Werle
1998). These models try to explain standardization as linear refinements over one dimension of
the standardization process (design or negotiation) while ignoring the other two. We argue that
such models are inadequate because they separate design (as covered by the product
development part), negotiation (as governed by the regulation metaphors), and sense-making
(which is currently neglected). If and when processes are nonlinear, all these elements should be
accounted for to some extent in the process. To this end, the D-S-N model can be used to
develop more contingency based process templates depending on the nature of D,S and N event
configurations and the likelihood of failing in one or several of the standardization activities.
Fourth, using D-S-N concepts, we can develop empirically grounded accounts of specific
standardization processes that allow expanded theorizing. Use of the D-S-N concepts enables
researchers to formulate specific process theories from standardization data. For example,
consortia based industries led standardization models like Bluetooth, 3G (3GPPP) or Java
development may lead to different ways of configuring, orchestrating and organizing D, S, and N
activities when compared with the traditional standardization processes followed in ITU or ISO
(Schmidt and Werle 1998). There is also more emphasis on peer based specification and
production modes (Benkler 2001) that negate the need to maintain intellectual property rights on
the innovations and recognize them as part of the standardization process. To do this we must
develop sharper constructs for identifying different types of D, S, and N activities and for
distinguishing between specific institutional ways to organize and coordinate standardization.
We must also develop categories that identify specific contingencies that influence the
distribution and configuration of D, S, and N activities over a set of standardization processes.
For example, it may be that D-, S-, N- activities have the same properties as Weick’s (Weick
1984) theory properties. Standard setters cannot pursue them all at the same time and one of
them may have to be sacrificed in the process of making a standard successful.

Conclusions
In this paper we have outlined a process theory of standardization. It draws upon and
integrates several separate lines of inquiry into a dynamic analysis of standardization processes.
It is not a theory, but a framework that enables theorizing over standardization processes in
specific contexts. We demonstrate in the paper how it can be used to orchestrate empirical
analyses of specific events during standardization processes. We provide evidence of the strength
of D-S-N based analysis by analyzing vignettes of three complex standardization processes and
by explaining their proceeding using the model.
We argue that D-S-N informed analyses and theories allow students of standardization to
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analyze a whole process of standardization as a sequence of events that carry forward acts of
design, acts of interpretation and sense-making and episodes of negotiation and translation. All
these events are recursively organized into a web of activities that span space and time. These
concepts highlight the non-linear and complex nature of standardization, which has been
neglected with past models of standardization. We demonstrate also the specific features of the
theories that can be generated using the concepts related to D-S-N and compare them with the
existing theories of standardization. The analysis shows that D-S-N theories trade off differently
the requirements of generality, accuracy, simplicity and explanatory power.
The developed model invites new research on several fronts. First, we need to extend the
analysis of activities to other standardization processes. Current analysis covered only fragments
of situations in telecom and wireless standardization. Obvious targets for empirical validation are
standardization processes outside official standardization bodies (e.g. Java) and emerging
interoperability standards in IT (like XML, EbXML). These processes may indicate specific
traits of D-, S- or N activities and their organization that are not present in studied
telecommunication standards. The work could also be used to understand complex infrastructure
development in general (see Bergman, King, and Lyytinen in press). There are several specific
topics in standardization that can be attacked by this line of inquiry including timing and
dynamical issues, more specific process analysis frameworks for specific standardization arenas.
In the future we need to focus on analyzing more detailed process patterns in typical
standardization situations and expand that to a set of standardization processes to analyze
variance. More work is required in order to integrate institutional aspects into standardization
process analysis.
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Appendix 1: Case Overviews
Our first case is the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) system. The case of the NMT
standard is an excellent example of a successful standard-making process (Fomin and Lyytinen
2000). There are several reasons why it is an interesting case for analysis. First, it was created at
the time when there was a market demand for this kind of technology, but the needed technology
was not yet available (Toivola 1992). Second, it was developed almost at the same time as
another major cellular telephony standard, namely AMPS 13 in the US, but witnessed much
greater acceptance and success (West 2000). The developers of the NMT system gambled on the
rapid advance of radio and micro-electronic technology and designed the system "for the future".
They ignored the fear of a high level of uncertainty due to their ability to anticipate in 1969 that
what national PTTs 14 had was "really a technology for the 60s, and that wouldn't do it for the
1970s" (Manninen and Fomin 1999). This move necessitated the PTTs to create close
relationships with otherwise external producers of telephone, radio, and micro-electronics
equipment. We believe there were important social and cultural implications in the standard
settings, which facilitated the standard creation process and paved the way for the standard to be
delivered to the market.
The second case, the GSM cellular telephony system, is interesting because of the
European PTTs’ political interests and ambitious aims in the standardization process. Many
European PTTs shared an opinion already in 1980 that each European country would benefit
from an introduction of a pan-European system (Bekkers and Smits 1998; Meurling and Jeans
1994; Toivola 1992). Non-official discussions in Paris in 1980 revealed that CEPT 15 would be
too cumbersome to lead the standardization work (Manninen et al. 2000; Toivola 1992). This
resulted in establishing Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM), a body subordinated to Committee for
Coordination and Harmonization (CCH) of CEPT. The goal of GSM group was to harmonize
technical and operational specifications for a public mobile system on the 900MHz frequency
(Toivola 1992). The creation of GSM ended the European fragmentation in the mobile telephony
and became a leading wireless standard (Mouly and Pautet 1992). Yet, before this was achieved,
many technical, economical and political challenges had to be resolved.
The third case involves standardization of short-range radio technology called
Bluetooth 16 . Already in the early 1990s, several electronics, information technology and
telecommunications firms explored possibilities of connecting devices such as mobile phones,
laptops and peripherals without wires. Several technological alternatives were developed to
address this challenge. In 1993, IrDA 17 was formed to create an infrared data interconnection
standard. Primarily, companies from the computing and semiconductor industry sponsored this
standard. At the same time several portable computer manufacturers experimented with radio
technology to address the problem that infrared technology required a line of sight between
devices. Yet, to make it widely applicable all manufacturers would have to conform to this
standard. Therefore, in 1997, five companies announced a consortium to develop and promote an
industry standard that would use radio technology. The consortium was organized so that these

13

AMPS – Advanced Mobile Phone System.
PTT – Post Telephone Telegraph, usually a state owned monopoly organization providing these service
15
CEPT – (Fr.) Conférence des Administrations Européenes des Postes et Télécommunications
16
See http://www.bluetooth.com
17
IrDA – The Infrared Data Association.
14

©2005 Sprouts 3(1), pp 29-60, http://sprouts.case.edu/2003/030102.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-10

59

FOMIN, KEIL AND LYYTINEN/THEORIZING ABOUT STANDARDIZATION

five companies would develop the standard while other companies were allowed to join the
consortium as adopters without any direct influence on the specifications. The initiative has been
successful in that over 200 firms have committed themselves as adopters to the specification
when version 1.0 was released in September 1999.
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